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Theory of mindAlthough language is a key tool for communication in social interaction, most studies in the neuroscience of lan-
guage have focused on language structures such as words and sentences. Here, the neural correlates of speech
acts, that is, the actions performed by using language, were investigated with functional magnetic resonance im-
aging (fMRI). Participants were shown videos, in which the same critical utterances were used in different com-
municative contexts, to Name objects, or to Request them from communication partners. Understanding of
critical utterances as Requests was accompanied by activation in bilateral premotor, left inferior frontal and
temporo-parietal cortical areas known to support action-related and social interactive knowledge. Naming, how-
ever, activated the left angular gyrus implicated in linking information about word forms and related reference
objects mentioned in critical utterances. These ﬁndings show that understanding of utterances as different com-
municative actions is reﬂected in distinct brain activation patterns, and thus suggest different neural substrates
for different speech act types.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Introduction
The primary function of human language is to allow efﬁcient com-
munication in social interaction. Yet, the neurobiological mechanisms
of this unique communication ability are still poorly understood. Most
previous neuroimaging studies focused on structural aspects of
language, including the brain basis of word and sentence processing.
However, in different communicative contexts, the same utterances
are used as tools for different communicative actions, that is, as ‘speech
acts’ with different functions, and are likewise understood in such
context-dependent manner (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1979; Wittgenstein,
1953). For example, the sentence “My car is here!” can be used to direct
the attention of the communication partner to a speciﬁc object, to
inform the partner about the location of the car, to offer a lift, or to ex-
press the speaker's relief that it has not been stolen. It is the situation,hiatry, Massachusetts General
stown, 02129, USA.
ge Laboratory, Department of
lin, Habelschwerdter Allee 45,
orova),
. This is an open access article undercontext and the social interactive knowledge, that is, pragmatic informa-
tion, that deﬁnes the communicative function of the utterance. This
study seeks to determine brain activation patterns indexing the com-
prehension of speciﬁc communicative functions by scrutinising the
most common speech acts of Naming and Requesting, performed by
uttering identical utterances.
A speech act can be deﬁned through a range of features, including
a) the linguistic utteranceused to perform it, b) the physical setting dur-
ing the communicative event, c) the action sequences in which the
speech act is embedded (i.e., actionspreceding and following the speech
act), and d) the intentions and assumptions of communicating partners
(Asher and Vieu, 2005; Austin, 1962; Bateman and Rondhuis, 1997;
Fritz and Hundsnurscher, 1994; Fritz, 2013; Searle, 1969; Van Dijk,
1977). Crucially, with every speech act, a set of likely subsequent ac-
tions, or response moves, can be predicted (Fritz, 2013; Pickering and
Clark, 2014), so a speech act can be seen as a speciﬁc set of action
predictions.
To illustrate the relationship between speech acts, i.e., their linguistic
and situational components, intentions and assumptions, and predictive
sequence structures, consider a situation, inwhich 2 people (called here
a Speaker and a Partner) sit at a table with several objects in front of
them: a glass of water, a carton of juice and an apple (the physical set-
ting for the communicative situation). If the Speaker utters the singlethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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there are several ways in which this can be understood by the Partner.
For example, in a communicative situationwhen the Partner had initial-
ly inquired “What are these called?”, the Speaker by uttering “water”
will perform the speech act of Naming. As both the Speaker and the
Partner know the language, this interaction can be seen as similar to,
for example, a question in an exam and an answer to it. In contrast, if
the Partner ﬁrst opens the sequence by saying “What can I get you?”,
then the same word “water”will be understood as a Request. This sim-
ple sequence is now used in away similar to ordering a drink in a bar. In
the two hypothetical cases above, the critical linguistic utterance
(“water”) and the physical setting (the table, the glass andother objects,
the two communication partners opposite each other) are identical. At
the same time, the communicative function and the features of context
critical for deﬁning it, especially the assumptions and intentions of both
communicating partners, as well as the expected action sequences, no-
ticeably differ. For the utterance to count as an instance of Naming, the
Speaker needs to assume that the used utterance is appropriate to refer
to the object in question, and that he/she pronounces it properly. Fol-
lowing the utterance performing the speech act of Naming, the Speaker
can, for instance, point at the Named object, the Partner can ascertain
the appropriateness of the utterance by repeating it, correcting it, or
asking the Speaker to repeat it. What appears of special relevance to
Naming is the semantic referential link between the speciﬁc object
and theword denoting it. In contrast, Requests involve additional action
knowledge (e.g., that an object needs to be manipulated) and social or
theory ofmind knowledge (e.g., recognising the Speaker's desire to obtain
the object).
Whilst the investigation of brain mechanisms of social-
communicative action understanding is a relatively new ﬁeld of study,
sometimes called neuropragmatics, some theoretical and experimental
work has already been done (Bara et al., 1997; Hirst et al., 1984;
Holtgraves, 2012; Stemmer et al., 1994). Neuropsychological research
on brain lesions eliciting deﬁcits in processing pragmatic information
provided evidence that cortical areas in both cerebral hemispheres can
be crucial for understanding even the basic speech acts, such as asser-
tions, commands, and Requests (Soroker et al., 2005). Furthermore,
some recent studies in healthy volunteers used neuroimaging methods
to investigate the brain basis of the so-called indirect speech acts, for ex-
ample when someone Requests that the window be opened by saying
“It is hot in here” rather than directly saying “Open the window” (Van
Ackeren et al., 2012); see also Basnáková et al. (2014). Other recent
work has focused on the neurophysiological basis of turn taking
(Bögels et al., 2015) and the partner knowledge in language processing
(Rueschemeyer et al., 2014). In thepresent study,we addressed thepre-
viously under-studied question of whether comprehension of basic
social communicative actions such as Naming an object or Requesting
it, placed in otherwise identical settings, would be reﬂected in different
neurometabolic signatures.
The current experiment manipulated speech act types whilst keep-
ing constant a range of relevant features of the stimulus materials and
communicative context. Not onlywere the sameutterances used to per-
form different speech acts, we also meticulously matched all visual,
acoustic and linguistic features of the stimulation, assuring, for example,
that the same physical setting was established with the same two com-
municating partners and the same sets of objects beingpresent in differ-
ent communicative contexts. Furthermore, the sequences and linguistic
contexts of each speech act type, Request and Naming, were matched.
Experimental predictions
The summarised linguistic and neurobiological considerations offer
speciﬁc hypotheses about the brain loci for speech act processing. As
Naming puts an emphasis on the link between a name and its
semantically related reference object, especially strong activation is pre-
dicted in this condition in areas relevant for linking linguistic and visualobject representations— in the middle temporal cortex (Damasio et al.,
1996; Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010) and the left angular gyrus
(Binder et al., 2009; Geschwind, 1970). Stronger activation for Requests
compared with Naming actions can be hypothesised in the areas
subserving action and social interaction knowledge. The areas linked to
action performance, perception and prediction are in the fronto-central
sensorimotor cortex (Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010; Pulvermüller
et al., 2014) and temporo-parietal cortex (Fogassi et al., 2005; Noordzij
et al., 2010; Saxe, 2009) and include the human homolog of the mirror
neuron system found in macaques and distributed across premotor,
inferior frontal and anterior inferior parietal cortex (Rizzolatti and
Fabbri-Destro, 2008; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). Cognitive process-
ing of others' assumptions and intentionsmay engagewhat is commonly
labelled the ‘theory of mind’, or ToM, system, which includes the medial
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate and the temporo-parietal junction
(Canessa et al., 2012; Frith, 2007; Spunt et al., 2011; Van Overwalle and
Baetens, 2009).
Previous studies of speech act processing showed a difference be-
tween speech act types in neurophysiological activation patterns re-
vealed by EEG and MEG (Egorova et al., 2013, 2014), but, due to the
known spatial imprecision and uncertainty of these methods
(Hamalainen et al., 1993), it is necessary to employ more precise
localisation tools to track focal activation changes reﬂecting communi-
cative action and interaction processing. Therefore, the current study fo-
cused on neurometabolic patterns revealed by fMRI to determine the
cortical foci indicative of speech act comprehension in the referential se-
mantic network, the action-semantic/mirror neuron network, and/or
the ToM network.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty healthy native English volunteers took part in the study. The
data from 2 participantswere discarded due to excessivemovement ar-
tefacts. The data from the remaining 18 participants (10 female) with
mean IQ scoreM=36.6 (range 28–44)measured by the Cattell Culture
Fair Test, Scale 2 Form A [Institute for Personality and Ability Testing,
1973 (Cattell, 1971)] , mean age 27 years (range 18–41) were analysed.
All the participants were right-handed as assessed with the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971), withmean laterality coefﬁcient
of 90.2 (range 60–100). The studywas approved by the Cambridge Local
Research Ethics Committee (Cambridge, UK). The experimental manip-
ulations were explained to the participants and informed consent was
obtained prior to the start of the experiment.
Stimuli
The stimuli consisted of 16 experimental video scenes showing two
persons (a “Partner” and a “Speaker”) sitting at a tablewith 12 objects in
front of them. Each scene appeared four times during the experiment,
resulting in a total of 64 speech act trial sequences. Each trial sequence
(Fig. 2) started with a context sentence uttered by the Partner, which set
the stage for the subsequent speech act, for which each of the critical
utterances (names of 5 out of 12 objects on the table) uttered by the
Speaker was used. Depending on the context sentence, the critical
words were used either to Name or to Request items on the table. Se-
quences of repeating speech acts in the experiment modelled repetitive
use of the same speech act type, as commonly used, for example, when
placing orders in a restaurant. Eachword appeared in both Naming and
Requesting conditions. Following the critical utterances, 5 nonverbal
actions corresponding to the speech act type of the trial sequence en-
sued, pointing at the mentioned objects in the Naming condition, and
handing the objects over in the Requesting condition. Context sentences
and subsequent actions were added to embed the speech acts in a nat-
ural context and to make sure, at the same time, that Naming and
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Fig. 1.Action sequence schemas of the speech acts of Naming (left) and Requesting (right) show typical actions following these speech acts and the intentions and assumptions (in shaded
boxes) associated with them.
What are these called? What can I get you?
tim
e
PLANT
NAMING REQUESTING
Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of the trial sequence in the fMRI experiment. A trial sequence started with a display of objects and communicating actors. A context sentence (e.g., “What are
these called?” in the Naming condition, or “What can I get you?” in the Requesting condition) was uttered by the Partner. Following this, a series of 5 scenes was shown, in which the
Speaker's face appeared together with the critical spoken utterance which served for Naming vs. Requesting an object (note that the words were identical for both speech acts, see the
Materials and methods section). The word scenes were followed by a series of 5 action scenes, involving the objects mentioned in the word utterances (handing over an object in the
Requesting condition or pointing at it in the Naming condition). Each context sentence, word, face and action video clips lasted about 2 s.
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860 N. Egorova et al. / NeuroImage 125 (2016) 857–867Request speech act trials were completed in a similar fashion. (Note that
Namingwithout pointing and Requestingwithout subsequent expected
actionmay be evaluated as unnatural; furthermore, the isolated presen-
tation of utterances outside action contexts may even undermine the
status of these utterances as speech acts of a speciﬁc type and their com-
municative relevance.) In addition to the critical trials with their Con-
text–Utterance–Action sequences (32 for each speech act type), we
added several control trials (16 per speech act type) in which Context
sentences were followed by silent still Face stimuli (5 face pictures ap-
peared instead of words). This type of trialmade it impossible to predict
upcoming speech acts with certainty, as the context sentences did not
always conclude with a Naming or Requesting action. Six individuals
(all native British English speakers) were used as actors in recording
the videos. Two of them (one female) acted as Partners, and four (two
female) were Speakers. Their positions in relation to each other (left–
right) were fully counterbalanced.
Six sentences matched on the number of words and complexity and
representing different syntactic types (interrogative, imperative) were
used to provide the context for the speech acts. Three introduced the
context for the speech act of Naming (e.g., “What are these called?”)
and three for the speech act of Request (e.g., “What can I get you?”).
These sentences were pseudo-randomly used in all trial sequences.
160 monosyllabic nouns from various semantic categories –
referring to food items, tools, animals, clothes and other everyday
objects – were used as stimuli. Their psycholinguistic features
(Table 1) were obtained from the CELEX database (Baayen et al.,
1993); furthermore, their semantic properties were rated (7-point
Likert scale) by a separate group of 10 native speakers of English.
Finally, all trials were evaluated by 5 native English speakers of sim-
ilar age and educational background to the oneswho took part in the ex-
periment. Each subject watched a set of 20 videos (10 of each type) and
described “what they saw and heard and what they understood the
Speaker and Partner did” in given trials. There was agreement on the
judgement of scene content, especially on that the Speaker either
Named (labelled, tagged, etc.) or Requested (asked for, solicited, etc.)
an object in the respective trials. Thus, despite the usage of the same ut-
terances, observers reliably understood the speech acts differently in
the two context types, in accord with the experimental design.Table 1
Psycholinguistic and semantic stimulus properties. The table showsmean values and stan-
dard error of the mean for each psycholinguistic and semantic parameter.
Psycholinguistic and semantic properties of word stimuli Mean value (SE)
Number of letters 4.2 (0.09)
Word form frequency 25.92 (4.37)
Logarithmic to base 10 of word frequency 1.16 (0.05)
Lemma frequency 58.13 (8.83)
Logarithm to base 10 of lemma frequency 1.51 (0.05)
Orthographic bigram frequency 3611.76 (1983.85)
Orthographic trigram frequency 3604.12 (273.79)
Orthographic neighbourhood size 8.58 (0.67)
Number of meanings 1.31 (0.07)
Word from frequency when used as a noun 25.4 (4.86)
Word from frequency when used as a verb 1.02 (0.4)
Lemma frequency when used as a noun 53.55 (11.7)
Lemma frequency when used as a verb 25.94 (10.38)
Action-relatedness 3.89 (0.12)
Hand-relatedness 3.71 (0.14)
Visual movement-relatedness 4.09 (0.12)
Familiarity 4.95 (0.16)
Imageability 6.45 (0.06)
Concreteness 6.66 (0.05)
Arousal 2.79 (0.11)
Valency 4.33 (0.08)
Potency 3.93 (0.1)Presentation procedure
The experiment started with visually presented instructions. The
participants were informed that they would see videos of two people
interacting, and that one of them would ask the other to name the ob-
jects on the table, or to ask for these objects. The different trial se-
quences appeared in a pseudo-randomised order.
Theparticipantswere instructed to carefullywatch the scenes show-
ing communication between two people andwere told that they would
be tested later to check if they paid attention to the content of the
videos. Subjects were not told to memorise scenes, utterances, persons
or objects. Therewas nobutton-press or othermotor task during the ex-
periment, as it would elicit motor activation that could contaminate the
motor system activation, which is especially important in this experi-
mental context, as language-related motor-system activity is predicted
to occur in response to speech acts as such.
After the participants came out of the scanner, they were given a list
of 40words, which contained bothwordsmentioned in the experimen-
tal video and previously unencountered foils. The task was to mark
the words they remembered as present in the videos, where they had
been part of critical utterances. Performance in the behavioural task
was assessed by calculating d-prime values for all participants. The
d-prime statistic measures the performance in discriminating between
targets and non-targets, by taking into account both hit rates and false
positive rates and thus controlling for any possible response bias. In
this experiment, the d-prime calculation was based on the discrimina-
tion between the words that appeared both in the experimental videos
and on the list (targets) and thewords that did not appear in the exper-
imental videos but were present on the list (non-targets).
Image acquisition and analysis
The experiment was run at the MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences
Unit, Cambridge (MRC-CBSU) using a 3 Tesla Siemens Tim Trio scanner
(Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany). MRC-CBSU continu-
ous “quiet” EPI sequence with a substantially reduced acoustic scanner
noise (Peelle et al., 2010) was used with TR= 2.656 s, TE = 44 ms, ac-
quiring 32 descending 3 mm thick slices in axial oblique orientation,
slice gap of 25%, FOV of 192 mm× 192mm, ﬂip angle of 83°, and band-
width of 1220 Hz/Px. The experiment was programmed in E-prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) and the scenes were
projected onto a screen, visible from the scanner via a mirror, whilst
the audio-visually presented context sentences and words were deliv-
ered via noise-insulated headphones.
Pre-processing and all analyses were done using the Statistical
Parametric Mapping software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK). The pre-processing included slice time correc-
tion, reorientation to correct for motion, spatial normalisation to the
standard MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute) template, smoothing
with an 8 mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian kernel and high-
pass ﬁlter.
General linear models were used for the ﬁxed effects analyses on
each subject's data.We focused on the sequences of 5 critical utterances
appearing after the context sentencewhichweremodelled as oneutter-
ance (including 5 utterances each) trial. The blocks were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). Other
types of events (e.g., Context sentences, Action blocks, as well as Face
blocks) were also modelled. These other types of events were crucial
to fulﬁl the conditions for a successful speech act (context sentences in-
troduced the situation, control face blocks prevented the context
sentences from unambiguously predicting upcoming speech acts;
action blocks were necessary to preserve the natural speech act
structures).
Group level randomeffect analysiswith the speech act condition as a
within subject factor was carried out for the whole brain volume in a
factorial design. This analysis was used to determine which brain
861N. Egorova et al. / NeuroImage 125 (2016) 857–867areas were predominantly engaged in the Naming and Request
conditions. The results from the whole-brain analysis were corrected
for multiple comparisons using false discovery rate (FDR) correction at
p b 0.05 for all brain areas.
Small volume correction (SVC) was used on a set of a priori regions
of interest (ROIs), based on the function–anatomy correlations
established independently in previous studies (Binder et al., 2009; Van
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). Spheres with an 8 mm radius around
the MNI coordinates taken from representative studies and reviews or
the centre of ROI mass in the Automated Anatomic Labeling (AAL)
atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002) were used for SVC; the coordinates
are provided in Table 4. Speciﬁcally, these a priori deﬁned regions
included
– the action-semantic andmirror neuron areas— left IFG (Caplan, 2006;
Fadiga and Craighero, 2006; Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004), bilateral PMC (Hauk et al., 2004;
Kiefer and Pulvermuller, 2012; Willems et al., 2010b), left aIPS
(Fogassi et al., 2005; Hamilton and Grafton, 2006; Ramsey et al.,
2012), right pSTS (Materna et al., 2008; Noordzij et al., 2010;
Proverbio et al., 2011; Redcay et al., 2012) as a multimodal integra-
tion area especially relevant for speech (Calvert, 2001; Hein and
Knight, 2008; Szycik et al., 2009);
– the theory of mind regions — bilateral TPJ (Saxe, 2009; Scholz et al.,
2009), medial PFC (Canessa et al., 2012; Frith, 2007; Spunt et al.,
2011; Willems et al., 2010a), as well as bilateral anterior cingulate
(Frith, 2007; Gallagher and Frith, 2003) for comprehension of Re-
quests;
– and referential-semantic brain region, the left angular gyrus (Binder
et al., 2009; Seghier et al., 2010) for understanding of the speech
acts of Naming.
A similar set of brain areas (bearing in mind the lower resolution of
themethod) has been previously identiﬁed in ourMEG study of Naming
and Requestingwith visually presentedwords (Egorova et al., 2014). All
SVCs were considered signiﬁcant at p b 0.05FWE-SVC. We also attempted
at extracting a set of ROIs traditionally linked to semantic processing.
These regions, in the inferior and middle temporal cortex produced
very little activation in the present study and no signiﬁcant differences
between conditions. We therefore omit them here.
In addition to the SVC analysis of activity in a priori deﬁned ROIs
(8 mm radius each), we extracted average BOLD signals using the
MarsBar utility (Brett et al., 2002) to compare average activation of
the action and theory of mind areas between speech act conditions. To
this end, a repeated measures ANOVA with factors System (Action-se-
mantic vs. Theory of Mind) and Speech act (Naming vs. Request) was
performed, followed by additional ANOVAs performed for each system
separately, using the factors ROI (5 levels) and Speech act (Naming vs.Table 2
Whole-brain random effects analysis for the contrast “Words N Faces”. For each region the table
FDR corrected), T-value, and Z-score.
Region Hemisphere Brodmann area MNI coo
x
Superior temporal/Heschl's gyrus L 48/42 −48
Superior temporal R 22 62
Middle temporal L 21/22 −64
Inferior temporal L 20 −50
Caudate L 48 −22
Hippocampus L 20 −38
Hippocampus R 20 42
Angular gyrus R 39 48Request) within each of the systems. Huynh–Feldt correction was
applied where appropriate.
In addition, we investigated the brain areas showing signiﬁcantly
stronger haemodynamic responses in the speech act conditions,
where spoken words were presented together with faces, contrasted
against the Face blocks, where faces were shown without linguistic
stimuli (contrast “Words N Faces”), using whole-brain analysis
(p b 0.05 FDR).
Results
Behavioural results
D-prime values were calculated as a measure of participants' perfor-
mance. For all subjects, d-prime values were high (mean 2.6, range
1.06–3.58), indicating good stimulus item recognition aswell as compli-
ance with the task and attention to the experimental scenes.
Imaging results
Comparison of all speech act conditions together against control face
trials (face without speech act) yielded activation in the bilateral supe-
rior temporal cortex, including the auditory cortex, consistent with
speech stimulation. In addition, middle and inferior temporal activation
was present, likely due to object-related referential expressions used in
all speech acts. Hippocampal activity was also observed, consistentwith
thememory load imposed by the experimental context. The right angu-
lar gyrus/right TPJ (Carter and Huettel, 2013)was found active, which is
consistent with the general involvement of the theory of mind process-
es in all speech acts under examination (Table 2).
In the critical analyses, which directly compared speech act condi-
tions with each other, the contrast “Request N Naming” showed signiﬁ-
cant differential activation (p b 0.05, FDR-corrected) in a number of
cortical areas in both hemispheres (Table 3), including the middle and
superior occipital areas. There was a signiﬁcant differential activation
in the left inferior frontal region, bilateral premotor and right posterior
temporal regions, including right pSTS. The activation for this contrast
is shown in red in Fig. 3A. On the contrary, the “Naming N Request” con-
trast did not produce any signiﬁcant activation at the FDR-corrected sig-
niﬁcance threshold of p b 0.05.
Small volume corrected ROI analysis performed for the regions se-
lected a priori following the previous literature (see Materials and
methods), revealed several signiﬁcant clusters for the action system
ROIs— left IFG, bilateral PMC, left aIPS, right pSTS, but no superthreshold
clusters for the ToMROIs in the “Request NNaming” contrast. The oppo-
site contrast, “Naming N Request” revealed only a non-signiﬁcant trend
for the left AG activation (Table 4).
To test the hypothesis that both the Action and the ToM systems
contribute to the processing of speech acts (especially Requests), weshows the label, hemisphere, Brodmann area, MNI coordinates, p-value (uncorrected and
rdinates p-Value (unc.) p-Value (FDR) T Z
y z
−14 −2 0.000 0.025 5.17 4.43
−16 −2 0.000 0.016 6.28 5.1
−36 8 0.000 0.026 4.95 4.28
−32 −16 0.000 0.039 4.22 3.77
10 22 0.000 0.026 4.89 4.24
−22 −8 0.000 0.045 4.09 3.67
−30 −8 0.000 0.032 4.41 3.9
−60 50 0.000 0.026 4.8 4.18
Table 3
Whole-brain random effects analysis for the contrast “Request N Naming”, p b 0.05 FDR-corrected. Regions in bold indicate a priori ROIs. For each region the table shows the label, hemi-
sphere, Brodmann area, MNI coordinates, p-value (uncorrected and FDR corrected), T-value, and Z-score. The reverse contrast “Naming N Request” did not produce any activations that
were signiﬁcant at the FDR-corrected p b 0.05 threshold.
Region Hemisphere Brodmann area MNI coordinates p-Value uncor p-Value FDR T Z
x y z
Middle occipital L 37 −42 −70 0 0.000 0.013 6.33 4.48
Posterior temporal R 37 42 −56 −2 0.000 0.013 7.41 4.98
Superior occipital L 19 −22 −88 38 0.000 0.018 4.99 3.86
Superior occipital L 18 −20 −98 22 0.001 0.047 3.91 3.26
Superior occipital R 18 24 −90 32 0.000 0.019 4.93 3.83
Superior occipital L 17 −12 −98 18 0.000 0.023 4.76 3.74
Postcentral R 3 40 −28 38 0.001 0.047 3.92 3.26
Superior frontal/precentral L 6 −26 −8 60 0.000 0.023 4.74 3.73
Superior frontal/precentral R 6 28 −10 58 0.000 0.025 4.65 3.68
Inferior frontal triangular L 46 −38 30 10 0.001 0.046 3.95 3.28
Inferior frontal triangular L 45 −46 28 8 0.001 0.049 3.87 3.23
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tained per condition from the same ten pre-deﬁnedROIs (on thebasis of
existing research results), ﬁve in the action-semantic and ﬁve in the
ToM system, respectively. The results showed a signiﬁcant interaction
of Speech act type and system [F(1,17) = 6.955, p = 0.017]. To further
understand this interaction, we performed a repeated measures
ANOVA on the ROIs by Speech act type within each system, and found
amain effect of Speech act type [F(1,17)=8.845, p=0.009] in theAction
system ROIs (Request N Naming) but no signiﬁcant effects or interac-
tions in the ToM system ROIs. Across all action system ROIs, activationB)
A)
Request>Naming
right postcentral sulcus ( 40 -28  38)
right pSTS (42 -56 2)
left IFG (-38 30 10)
C)
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Fig. 3.Main results. A.Whole-brain analysis activation for the contrasts “Request N Naming” (sh
analysis, small volume corrected (SVC) at FWE p b 0.05, rendered at p b 0.01 (unc.), k = 10. C
frontal gyrus, aIPS — anterior intraparietal sulcus, vmPFC — ventromedial prefrontal cortex, AGwas signiﬁcantly greater for Request than for Naming, Fig. 3C. Pairwise
comparisons (Naming vs. Request) for each of the ROIs in the Action
system were signiﬁcant, corrected for multiple comparisons with FDR
adjustment, p b 0.047.
Discussion
The comprehension of different speech acts performed with the
same words in closely matched interactive settings led to signiﬁcantly
different brain activation patterns. Requesting objects compared to6
4
2
left AG (-45 -61 36)
4
3
2
1
0
Naming>Request
left precentral gyrus (-26 -8 60 )  
right precentral gyrus (28 -10 58)
 13) left aIPS (-41 -37 50)
(−41, −37, 50)−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
left aIPS
5, 66)
PMC
(52, −56, 13)−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
right pSTS
NAM
REQ
own in red) and “Naming N Request” (in blue), rendered at p b 0.05 FDR-corrected. B. ROI
. Signal extraction ROI analysis. pSTS — posterior superior temporal sulcus, IFG — inferior
— angular gyrus, PMC— premotor cortex.
Table 4
ROI analysis SVC, corrected at p b 0.05 family-wise error small volume correction (FWE-SVC), 8-mm spheres. For each region the table shows the label, MNI coordinate, p-valueuncor, p-
valueFWE-SVC, T-value, and Z-score.
ROI label x y z p uncor p FWE T Z
Request N Naming
Left inferior frontal gyrus triangular, lIFG (AAL) −47 30 14 0.001 0.028 3.87 3.23
Left premotor cortex, lPMC (Willems et al., 2010b) −22 −5 66 0.000 0.009 4.56 3.63
Right premotor cortex, rPMC (Willems et al., 2010b) 22 −5 66 0.001 0.034 3.76 3.16
Right posterior superior temporal sulcus, rpSTS (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) 52 −56 13 0.000 0.015 4.25 3.46
Left anterior intra-parietal sulcus, laIPS (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) −41 −37 50 0.001 0.039 3.66 3.10
Medial prefrontal cortex, mPFC (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) 1 56 13 – – – –
Left temporo-parietal junction, lTPJ (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) −52 −55 29 – – – –
Right temporo-parietal junction, rTPJ (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009) 52 −55 29 – – – –
Left anterior cingulate, lACC (AAL) −5 35 14 – – – –
Right anterior cingulate, rACC (AAL) 7 37 16 – – – –
Naming N Request
Left angular gyrus, lAG (AAL) −45 −61 36 0.002 0.071 3.27 2.84
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left inferior frontal (IFG), bilateral premotor cortex (PMC), aswell as the
left anterior inferior parietal cortex (aIPS), right posterior superior tem-
poral sulcus (pSTS) and adjacent occipital cortex. In turn, Naming
tended tomore strongly activate the left angular gyrus (AG) in the pos-
terior parietal cortex, compared with Requesting. These differences in
cortical activation cannot be attributed to either the critical linguistic
stimuli, as these were kept constant across tasks, or to the general stim-
ulus setup (including perception of actions and objects), as that was
strictly matched. Therefore, they are most likely related to the speciﬁc
communication contexts in which the linguistic utterances were used.
Understanding a Request implies knowledge about the rich sequence
structure of this speech act, that is, about the set of manual or verbal ac-
tions that typically follow Requests in real dialogues and therefore can
be predicted (Alston, 1964; Pickering and Garrod, 2009; Van Berkum,
2010) from the critical utterances used in the Request context. We
hypothesise that the motor system and the left inferior frontal gyrus
are the brain regions supporting prediction of a rich set of possible but
alternative response actions (see Fig. 1 for illustration) forming the
mental basis for Request processing.
Distinct brain correlates for understanding speech act types
As demonstrated by the results, when subjects observe and under-
stand communicative interactions between the Speaker and the Part-
ner, different brain activation patterns emerge for comprehending the
communicative speech acts of Requesting and Naming. Note that this
paradigm did not use an active speech production task, where subjects
would perform the relevant speech acts themselves, nor were subjects
directly addressed in the dialogue sequences or had to respond to the
crucial speech acts. Our intention was to minimise the likelihood of
any movement artefacts in this experiment whilst focusing on such
relevant aspect of communicative competence as the capacity to
understand communicative interaction between other individuals, as it
is required, for example, to watch a TV interview or follow a conversa-
tion between two friends. We instructed our subjects to focus their at-
tention on understanding the communication between the Speaker
and the Partner; in order to keep them motivated and attentive
throughout the experiment, we told them that a test (the nature of
which remained unspeciﬁed until after fMRI scanning) would be ad-
ministered after the experiment.
In investigating speech act understanding, we focused on two ac-
tions, Naming and Requesting, which are key speech acts in communi-
cation theory and have been used to illustrate pragmatic language
function (Wittgenstein, 1953; Baker & Hacker, 2009). Naming can be
seen as an elementary language function for which the referential rela-
tionship betweenwords and objects ismanifest. Assumptions about the
Speaker and the Partner are involved insofar as the labels used and theirobject links are considered part of the language knowledge and com-
mon ground of both. Correspondingly, Naming actions in real life, for
example in the context of questions in a foreign language test, could
be followed by corrections (as indicated in Fig. 1). In contrast, the Re-
quest actions, compared with Naming in the present experiment,
imply a substantially richer communicative context, in which each Re-
quest can not only (as any action) be followed by corrections, but is
ﬁrmly associated with the speciﬁc prediction that the partner hands
over the Requested object or, alternatively, refuses or rejects the Re-
quest (which, in turn, can be done verbally, by gesture or facial expres-
sion). This richer set of action predictions, which is characteristic of
Requests according to pragmatic theories, was reﬂected in the activa-
tion of the left inferior frontal, left inferior parietal and bilateral
premotor cortices. These regions are also part of the cortical system
for motor and action processing, where, in the monkey cortex, mirror
neurons are frequently found (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Rizzolatti and Fabbri-Destro, 2008). The stronger activation during Re-
quest understanding, compared with that of Naming, may therefore re-
ﬂect the prediction of actions such as manual handing over the
Requested object or explicit verbal or manual rejection of the Request.
The localisation of the Request activation in the inferior frontal Broca's
region (pars triangularis, BA45) and dorsolateral premotor cortex
(hand representation) is consistent with this interpretation and con-
ﬁrms predictions of the action perception model discussed in the
Introduction section. The anterior inferior parietal cortex is also part of
the action andmirror neuron system, so that its stronger activation dur-
ing Requests is also in line with the action prediction perspective. A de-
gree of arbitrariness exists for the left temporo-parietal cortex, where
part of the angular gyrus, tended to be activatedmore strongly by Nam-
ing. Amirror neuron perspectivemight have suggested the opposite but
thewell-known function of the left AG as a hub for semantic processing
(Binder et al., 2009; Seghier et al., 2010) might tentatively explain the
stronger activation tendency during the speech act, emphasising the
referential word–object link. Other areas also known to contribute to
referential knowledge, such as anterior temporal cortex, did not show
differential activation for the speech acts under investigation. Key sites
for ToM processing, such as the right TPJ, were active during processing
of both speech act types.
Requests and the action prediction system
Several studies suggested that, due tomirrormechanisms linking to-
gether action and perception circuits, the action system of the human
brain is engaged when people observe the actions of others (Decety
et al., 1997; Fadiga et al., 1995; Ramsey and Hamilton, 2012; Van
Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The reason for this activation may be
an intrinsic link between action and perception mechanisms due to
pre-established wiring and associative learning (Pulvermüller and
864 N. Egorova et al. / NeuroImage 125 (2016) 857–867Fadiga, 2010) and the resultantmechanisms for predictive processing of
actions based on sensory input alone (Kilner et al., 2007). In this view,
the action-semantic and mirror neuron systems may also contribute
to the understanding of communicative actions. Consistent with the
prediction hypothesis,mirror neurons in the inferior frontal and parietal
areas were shown to process information about action goals and inten-
tions motivating motor acts (Fogassi et al., 2005; Ramsey et al., 2012).
Therefore, it is possible that the activations observed in the inferior fron-
tal, premotor cortex and anterior inferior parietal cortex contribute to
the recognition of communicative intentions and goals and in the pre-
diction of subsequent actions, which is especially important when pro-
cessing Requests. Note that the link between actions and their goals or
intended consequences is part of the predictive sequence structure
characterising speech acts (Fig. 1). For example, the goal of obtaining
the Requested object is manifest in the expected Partner action of
handing over the object (as discussed in the previous section). There-
fore, the strong involvement of the action and mirror neuron system
in frontal and parietal cortices when understanding Requests, observed
in the current experiment, may reﬂect two inseparable aspects of
speech acts: the processing of communicative intentions and goals
characterising the speech act and the predicted sequence structure of typ-
ical response actions. On the other hand, it is also possible that the exper-
imental setting, which encouraged the expectation of amanual action of
handing over the target object, led to activation of the mirror neuron
system during Requests. However, this interpretation suggests a com-
parably strong sensorimotor involvementwhen expecting pointing ges-
tures, which regularly followed the Naming actions in our experimental
design, and therefore fails to account for the difference betweenNaming
and Requesting. Therefore, we tend to favour the alternative possibility
that the speech act of Requesting, characterised as a socially established
goal-directed intentional activity embedded in a sequence of communi-
cative actions and requiring speciﬁc shared knowledge between com-
munication partners, activates a speciﬁc type of action prediction
circuit (Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010; Pulvermüller et al., 2014). This
speech act circuit appears to be distributed over fronto-parietal areas.
At the cognitive level, its activation may imply the computation of an
action tree (see Fig. 1) that includes the future actions and outcomes
predictably tied to the knowledge about the socially established com-
municative action1.
In addition, increased activation in the bilateral temporo-occipital
cortex for Requests compared with Naming was observed, although it
had not been explicitly hypothesized previously. We suggest that this
stronger activation in areas related to visual information processing
may also be best explained in the action prediction context. The richer
predictions implicated by Requests, in addition to being manifest in
expectations of motor activity, may also lead to expectations of the up-
coming visual input. Brain correlates of visual expectations and predic-
tions are known to modulate activity in the occipital and middle
temporal cortex (Cléry et al., 2013; Den Ouden et al., 2009). Speech
act-related modulation of activity in these areas observed here may
therefore provide a candidate explanation in terms of predictive coding
(Kilner et al., 2007). An alternative explanation may be offered in terms
of memory processes or imagery, which our subjectsmay have engaged1 In this study we concentrated on the analysis of identical single word utterances
representing the speech acts of Naming and Requesting, which were introduced by the
Context sentences. Since each speech act, as represented by the action sequence tree,
can be followed by certain other types of speech acts, it is possible that the upcoming
speech act type could be predicted already at the stage of the Context sentence itself.
For example, the speech act of Inquiry (“What are these called?”) can be typically followed
by Naming (“Tea”), Clariﬁcation (“What did you say?”), and Rejection (“I don't know”),
whilst the speech act of Offer (“What can I get you?”) could be preferentially followed
by Requesting (“Tea”), Clariﬁcation (“What do you have?”), and Rejection (“Nothing”), re-
spectively. In order to prevent predictability of upcoming Naming or Requesting actions,
we included these alternative speech acts in our study, as well as trials with still faces re-
placing the word videos (see Fig. 1). Our study did not have sufﬁcient power to examine
the contrast between Context sentence types; it is possible that some precursors of speech
act differences could be detected before the onset of the critical words.in attempting to memorise features of the presented scenes. However,
such general memory or imagery related activation could not easily ex-
plain why Requests led to stronger activation than Naming, because
memory and imagery should equally be possible with both. In addition,
the pattern of brain activation observed in the Request condition ap-
pears quite different from typical memory activation patterns, normally
spread across the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the hippocampal
formation (Ishai et al., 2000). These activations were absent in the
present contrast; instead, we observed premotor and anterior inferior
frontal activation differences, which are more in line with the action
prediction hypothesis. Finally, the hippocampus was equally engaged
during both types of speech acts, as the results suggest, which further
discourages a differential memory interpretation. However, memory
processes are engaged by all speech acts, as memory is necessary to re-
late utterances to their preceding context.
Some features of our experimental communicative settings may
seem atypical at a ﬁrst glance, but, in our view, represent one relevant
choice amongst a set of equal alternatives, whilst helping to accommo-
date our experimental questionswithin conﬁnements of fMRI recording
settings. First, following each context sentence, critical speech acts were
always presented consecutively in groups of 5 actions of the same type.
As mentioned in the Materials and methods section, this mirrors com-
munication typical for, e.g., placing orders in restaurants or shops. Fur-
thermore, because the complex set of actions that may follow speciﬁc
speech acts in dialogues (see Fig. 1) cannot be captured by a single pre-
diction, our design realised different response options to the context
sentence; however, alternative action options were not realised upon
Naming and Requests, which were always followed by the respective
‘typical best’ response action (pointing or handing over). This simpliﬁ-
cation of the action tree should not distract from the fact that, even
though alternative response expectations to critical utterances were
not encouraged in the present experimental context, speech act under-
standing can be described in terms of action predictions acquired in the
broader context of language learning in social interaction (Alston, 1964;
Fritz, 2013; Tomasello, 2010). An MEG experiment similar to the pres-
ent one realised several different response types to the critical utter-
ances (Egorova et al., 2014) and showed that the stronger activation
of the motor system in Request contexts was also present with such
richer communicative embedding. Future research may fruitfully focus
on the inﬂuence of the relationship of general action predictions
characterising a socially established communicative action and the par-
ticular predictions enforced by speciﬁc experimental settings.
A further possible criticism addresses the linguistic structural level.
According to some linguistic theories, single word utterances such as
the ones used as critical stimuli, are conceptualised as ellipses,
i.e., short forms derived from more elaborate structures by omitting
some of their syntactic constituents, especially when they are supplied
by the context (Matthews, 2007) (for example see (Claus, 2015) for re-
cent experimental evidence on syntactic gapping). In this view, single
words would ﬁrst need to be expanded into full sentences during com-
prehension, e.g., “water” into whole sentences such as “Please give me
water”, or “The object to which I point is water”. A strong ellipse exten-
sion perspective could suggest that, what we consider as speech act dif-
ferences might in fact be attributable to syntactic differences in
presumed expanded ‘deep structural’ representations. Assuming that
such expanded structures would come with subject, predicate and ob-
ject, this approach might possibly lead to a straightforward explanation
of differential involvement of the inferior frontal cortex. It, however,
would not explain differential engagement of the precentral cortex
and the angular gyrus, because syntactic processing seems to be
bound to different brain structures. Moreover, a range of possible ex-
panded versions are available for each context (for Request: “Give me
X”, “Please give me X”, “I would like to ask you to take X and hand it
over to me”; likewise, for Naming: “This is X”, “I call this X”, “The
name of this object is X and I would suggest we both use this word to
speak about it” etc.) and thus the choice of speciﬁc ‘deep structural’
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For these reasons, expanding elliptical structures to full sentences
does not seem to provide a convincing explanation for why the ob-
served brain structures become differentially engaged for Requesting
and Naming. Furthermore, whilst the fMRI technique does not provide
satisfactory temporal resolution, our previous EEG and MEG work sug-
gested very rapid engagement of these systems (within ~200 ms),
thus providing an argument against any elliptical expansion potentially
requiring more processing time. For further arguments against the idea
that single word utterances are necessarily elliptical, see (Wittgenstein,
1953 and Baker and Hacker, 2009).
Although neuroscience studies of communicative actions are sparse,
some important research has recently been conducted in this domain
(see Introduction) and we should therefore relate our present ﬁndings
to some of this earlier work. A recent study (Van Ackeren et al., 2012)
looked at statements, such as “It is hot in here” used either for Informing
others of the ambient temperature or as indirect Requests to open the
window. The visual context that accompanied the linguistic utterances
differed between the Informing and Requesting conditions —
e.g., images of a desert landscape or a window, respectively. Stronger
brain activation for indirect Requests appeared in the fronto-central ac-
tion system as well as in the parietal areas previously related to mirror
neuron intention understanding (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). A second set of increased brain responses to indirect
Requests appeared in the medial prefrontal cortex and bilateral
temporo-parietal junction, regions typically observed in theory of
mind (ToM) processing, for example when people think about others'
knowledge and intentions (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). Howev-
er, as this previous study altered communicative function (Request vs.
Informing) together with directness (indirect vs. direct), it is difﬁcult
to draw conclusions on which of these factors – communicative func-
tion, (in)directness, or both – explain the observed differences in brain
activation. Similarly, Basnáková et al. (2014) investigated the difference
between answers given directly as statements following questions
(“How is it … to give a presentation?” followed by “It's hard to give a
good presentation”) or indirectly by justifying the implied answer
(e.g., “How did you ﬁnd my presentation?” followed by “It's hard to
give a good presentation”). Stronger brain activation to indirect justiﬁ-
cations than to direct statements was seen in areas related to ToM (me-
dial prefrontal cortex, right temporo-parietal junction), emotion
(anterior cingulate, anterior insula) and action processing (inferior fron-
tal cortex, SMA). In this study, indirectness also came with a change in
speech act type (statement vs. justiﬁcation), so that a degree of open-
ness remains for the interpretation of brain activation signatures. In
contrast, as our present results were obtained using speech acts devoid
of the indirectness and emotionality confounds, they can unambiguous-
ly link speech act type and local cortical activation, that is, fronto–
parieto-temporal activation to Requests, and possibly directive speech
acts in general, as compared with the left parietal activation to Naming,
or, possibly assertive speech actsmore generally (Searle, 1979). The pre-
vious studies and the current one agree in that directives activate the
fronto-parietal cortexmore strongly than assertives. Looking at the pre-
vious results discussed above in the context of the present report, the
following could be suggested in an attempt at their integration:
(i) ToM activation is a general feature appearing across speech act
types (cf. right TPJ activation to both Requests and Naming in the pres-
ent study), butmay be ampliﬁed for indirect speech acts. (ii) Motor sys-
tem activation seems more pronounced for directive speech acts than
for assertive ones.
Theory of mind and common ground processing
The general engagement across speech act types of an area belong-
ing to the core ToM network, the right TPJ, seems to be in good agree-
ment with the view that both declarative and Requestive actions
represent relevant ways for communicating, and likewise involveunderstanding of intentions, assumptions and the so-called common
ground of communication partners (Tomasello et al., 2007). However,
although understanding the intentions and assumptions of the commu-
nication partners may be seen as more relevant for Request actions
(considering the intention to obtain the Requested object, the assump-
tion that the other person can provide it, and many others) compared
with Naming, we did not ﬁnd any evidence of the difference between
speech acts in key regions of the ToM network. Previous results seem
to partly contrast with this ﬁnding, as studies on communicative
pointing have shown that declarative pointing – to inform others
about one's own taste – can lead to stronger engagement of ToM and
affective-emotion areas than Requestive pointing performed to obtain
food (Brunetti et al., 2014; Committeri et al., 2015). However, this virtu-
al discrepancywith the present ﬁndings can be explained by task differ-
ences. As the ‘declarative’ speech act in this important work by Brunetti
and Committeri wasmade to express a personal taste and preference, it
can be seen as closely related to ‘expressive’ speech acts (Searle, 1979)
performed to externalise an internal emotional state, i.e., the love for
speciﬁc food items. The engagement of limbic and ToM circuits in
these studies may therefore reﬂect the emotion-expressive character,
rather than the declarative aspect of the ‘expressive–declarative
pointing’ actions implemented. In addition, studies that reported ToM
activation often involved tasks explicitly requiring subjects to reﬂect
on the communicative intention of utterances or actions (Brass et al.,
2007; Spunt and Lieberman, 2013; Van Ackeren et al., 2012). Our obser-
vation of speech act independent activity in one part of the ToM net-
work, in the right TPJ (Carter and Huettel, 2013), is consistent with
earlier reports that the ToM network is involved in communicative pro-
cessing of linguistic and nonlinguistic information (Brass et al., 2007;
Enrici et al., 2011; Lombardo et al., 2010; Ramsey and Hamilton, 2012;
Spunt et al., 2011; Walter et al., 2004). We should, however, mention
that the results of our previous MEG study (Egorova et al., 2014), in
which single-trial speech acts were presented, suggested preferential
engagement of ToMareas in Request understanding, yielding some sup-
port for its speech act speciﬁcity. In sum, someopen questions remain to
be addressed in future studies that could investigate the possible speci-
ﬁcity of ToM network activations to speech acts, tasks and speciﬁc fea-
tures of experimental paradigms in more detail.
Referential processing
For both Naming and Requesting of objects, a link must be made be-
tween aword and an object. However, asNaming speciﬁcally directs the
attention of the listener to this referential information,we hypothesized
that temporal and left temporo-parietal regions (particularly the angu-
lar gyrus) relevant for referential knowledgewould bemore active dur-
ing Naming than during Requesting. Our results provide only weak
support of this hypothesis, as temporal areas did not show a signiﬁcant
difference between the speech acts, and the AG only revealed amargin-
ally signiﬁcant effect (Naming N Requesting).
Hemispheric involvement
Consistent with earlier reports (Weylman et al., 1989; Zaidel et al.,
2000), both hemispheres were active in speech act processing, with
speciﬁc areas in each hemisphere selectively responding to different
speech act types. In line with the observation of Soroker et al. (2005),
who examined patientswith focal cortical lesions and found that lesions
in both hemispheres can impair the ability to understand speech acts,
we here report that activation in both hemispheres indexes speech act
processing. For example, bilateral premotor activations appeared to be
stronger for Requests than for Naming. On the other hand, these data
do not strongly support the hypothesis put forward in some previous
studies (Holtgraves, 2012; McDonald, 2000) that the right hemisphere
is more relevant for pragmatic knowledge than the left. Instead, as has
previously been suggested for semantic processing (Pulvermüller
866 N. Egorova et al. / NeuroImage 125 (2016) 857–867et al., 2009), pragmatic information about speech acts appears to be car-
ried by neuronal circuits distributed across both cortical hemispheres
(Fig. 3A).
Conclusions
Speech act understanding is reﬂected in local cortical activity. In par-
ticipants observing and understanding communicative interactions, in
which one actor either Named objects in front of their Partner or Re-
quested objects from that Partner, these different speech acts of
Requesting and Naming activated different sets of cortical areas. The
main function of Naming is to refer to an object by using a linguistic ex-
pression, which requires referential-semantic knowledge linking the
two. The left angular gyrus, interfacing between visual and language
areas tended to show relatively stronger activity during Naming com-
pared with Requests. In contrast, Request understanding implies
forming rich predictions on likely partner actions, which could typically
follow this act in social communicative interaction (handing over the
object, denying the Request etc.). Consistent with the relevance of pre-
dictive action knowledge for this speech act type, Requests activated the
inferior frontal, premotor, parietal and temporo-occipital cortices most
important for action and action sequence processing and for predicting
future action performance and (auditory/visual) perception. The right
TPJ, known to be the main site for the processing of theory of mind
and common ground knowledge, was found equally active for both
speech acts. In sum, we show that the key human capacity of
communicative use of language in social interaction context relies on
a coordinated effort of a bilaterally distributed network unifying a
range of multimodal neurocognitive systems. Whilst only two typical
speech act types were examined here, systematic neuro-cognitive in-
vestigations of the brain basis of a wide range of communicative actions
seems to be an exciting new arena for exploring the unique human ca-
pacity of social-communicative interaction.
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